The words, pinned down.

Adoption

Bringing a copy that is already installed under management without reinstalling it. A copy recognised by a product code can be adopted in bulk; one winget identifies, but Attestree did not install, is adopted one row at a time; a name-and-version guess is never offered. Un-adopting uninstalls nothing.

Details: Adopting an existing fleet →

Attestation

Also: attested, verified

The verdict a successful detonation records for exact installer bytes, as declared for one architecture and install scope. Each installer of a version has its own verdict, and one that never ran is unverified. An x86 installer verified on the x64 sandbox counts for every endpoint that runs it; an Arm installer cannot be verified yet. The verdict travels with the bytes, not with a package name or version label. An operator’s word is never an attestation. A dedicated instance serves only verified installers.

Details: What gets tested →

Attestation tier

How an attested version is graded, strongest first: attested-signed, attested-unsigned, attested-unsigned-driver (the run added a driver or service whose signature did not chain to a trusted root), attested-mitm (the run had inspected internet access), and unattested. On this site, “tier” always means this.

Details: Roles and policy →

Attested feed

Also: fence, fenced source

The winget source your server runs. The agent points winget on each endpoint at it and closes the public sources through Group Policy (the fence), re-checking and repairing it, and each check-in reports whether the fence is applied. An endpoint whose fence is not applied installs from the public winget source instead, and the console shows it unfenced. The feed serves a winget installer only once a sandbox verified it. On Community Edition, once per-box serving is on, it also serves an installer an operator accepted unverified.

Details: Desired state and the endpoint →

Audit bundle

The one-action export of audit events for a window you choose: re-verified, written as canonical JSON and sealed with a SHA-256 manifest, signed with the platform’s span key. It verifies offline with wep-bundle-verify.

Details: The audit export →

Audit event

Also: span, signed audit event

One operator or system action, signed with ECDSA P-256 before it is stored and never rewritten afterwards. The platform signs its own events; each agent from 0.240.0 on signs its own. A signature proves the event unedited, not the log complete.

Details: Audit events and their keys →

Break-glass

Two different things. On a dedicated instance, the one local admin account kept for when Entra sign-in fails, usable only with TOTP. On Community Edition, the host-side ceremony that recovers a locked-out last admin; every use writes an audit record.

Details: Sign-in →

Broker

The service on the detonation host that verifies the golden image, starts each sandbox from it, enforces the run deadline and collects the result. The control plane only queues work for it.

Details: What gets tested →

Byte store

Where your server keeps a detonated winget installer’s bytes, so the feed serves that installer itself instead of pointing endpoints at the vendor’s URL. A version without kept bytes is still pinned to the same SHA-256.

Details: Versions withdrawn upstream →

Catalog evidence bundle

What the catalog’s Export evidence writes: each selected version’s signed statement and SBOM, or the reason one is absent, under one signed statement for the whole bundle. Specified at /attestation/evidence-bundle/v1/.

Details: Catalog evidence and fleet inventory →

Check-in

The agent’s regular call to the control plane, every 15 minutes by default, or sooner when the server wakes it. Each check-in fetches desired state and reports what the endpoint has.

Details: Desired state and the endpoint →

Community Edition

The free, self-hosted edition, for up to 200 endpoints. It signs with keys kept as files on your host, uses local accounts, and has no Entra sign-in.

Details: Sign-in →

Confident, possible, can’t tell

The three classes of a CVE match. Confident: a pin or the shipped alias list maps the product and the record places the version inside. Possible: a hedged mapping, shown and labelled possible, which never fires. Can’t tell: the record cannot place the version.

Details: Confident, possible, can’t tell →

cvelistV5

INDUSTRY TERM

The CVE Program’s public repository of CVE records in the JSON 5 format. Attestree’s fleet CVE index streams it and keeps only the records that matter to your fleet and catalog.

Details: Sources, and what is stored →

Dedicated instance

The commercial edition: one Attestree instance per customer, deployed into an Azure subscription you own and operated and upgraded by Attestree. People sign in with Entra ID, and the signing keys live in a Key Vault there.

Details: Sign-in →

Desired state

Also: reconcile, drift

What the control plane says an endpoint should have installed. The agent fetches it at each check-in, acts on it only if its HMAC checks out, and reconciles the endpoint toward it. Drift is a managed package that has moved off the version it should be at.

Details: Desired state and the endpoint →

Detonation

Running a package’s exact installer bytes in a disposable, isolated sandbox VM to record what they do: files written, persistence registered, network traffic.

Details: What gets tested →

Detonation host

The Hyper-V or Proxmox machine you attach to run sandboxes; its broker does the work. Without one, nothing is verified, so by default no winget version is served. On Community Edition you can instead turn on one deployment-wide acceptance, which serves unverified installers once per-box serving is on.

Details: What gets tested →

Golden image

Also: golden VHDX

The signed Windows VM disk every sandbox is cloned from. The broker refuses an image not signed with a key you trust. What the SBOM covers depends on which image ran. Its build record is the “Golden VHDX build” format.

Details: What the SBOM covers →

HMAC

INDUSTRY TERM

A keyed checksum both sides compute. The agent checks one on every desired-state response, keyed by its one-time check-in secret, and rejects a response that was altered. Both sides hold the key, so it proves integrity, not who sent it.

Details: Desired state and the endpoint →

in-toto and DSSE

INDUSTRY TERM

in-toto is an open format for statements about software artifacts: a subject (here, the installer’s SHA-256) and a typed claim about it. DSSE is the signed envelope it travels in.

Details: The signed statement →

Ingest

Bringing a new package version into your catalog from its public source. For winget, ingest queues the version for detonation.

Details: What gets tested →

Inventory export

What your endpoints report, as JSON and CSV under a signed statement. User names are left out unless the exporter has the permission, asks, states a purpose, and the tenant allows it. The signature says the rows were exported unchanged, not that an agent’s report is true.

Details: Catalog evidence and fleet inventory →

KEV

INDUSTRY TERM

The US CISA catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities: CVEs with evidence of exploitation in the wild. A confident match can fire only for a CVE that is KEV-listed or Critical.

Details: What can raise an alarm →

Per-box serving

Also: waiting for verification

A per-deployment switch, off by default, that you turn on with a typed confirmation after a census preview of what it changes. With it on, the feed offers each endpoint only the one installer the platform named for it: verified for its architecture and install scope, or on Community Edition accepted. An endpoint whose installer is not verified yet waits for verification, and nothing is uninstalled while it waits. With it off, the feed offers every endpoint in a ring the version’s attested installers.

Details: What gets served →

Per-user install

Also: SYSTEM, hollow install

An app installed into one person’s profile rather than for the whole machine. The agent runs as SYSTEM, so a per-user winget installer has to run as the signed-in user; run as SYSTEM, it lands in the SYSTEM profile where no person can see it, a hollow install. Per-user installs cover winget only.

Details: Chocolatey and Scoop →

Quarantined

A version whose detonation failed in a way the platform could not classify, or whose installer reports a different version than its manifest names (winget only, since platform 0.247.0). It waits for an operator and is never served. It is not a malware verdict.

Details: What gets tested →

Ring

Also: promote, roll back

A stage of rollout: canary, pilot, broad, all. To promote is to make a version the one a ring installs; a ring keeps the version armed beside it, and rolling back makes that version active again.

Details: Roles and policy →

Roles and Cedar

Every console user holds one of four roles: admin, catalog author, auditor or read-only. A built-in engine that implements a subset of the Cedar policy language decides what each role may do. Writing your own Cedar policies is not available yet.

Details: Roles and policy →

SBOM

INDUSTRY TERM

Also: CycloneDX, Syft

A software bill of materials: a list of the components in a piece of software. Attestree’s are CycloneDX documents that Syft writes inside the sandbox. They are third-party SBOMs: a scan of what an installer put on disk, not the vendor’s own list.

Details: What the SBOM covers →

Shim

The open-source (Apache-2.0) installer executor the agent starts for each install. Before running anything as SYSTEM it checks that its caller is the real agent, and it refuses arguments that would switch a manager’s hash check off.

Details: Desired state and the endpoint →

Signed statement

The file Attestree signs for each installer a detonation verifies: an in-toto statement in a DSSE envelope, signed with ECDSA P-256, whose subject is that installer’s SHA-256. A version can have several. A statement does not yet name the installer’s architecture or install scope; the console shows those. “Attestation” is the verdict; the signed statement is the record of it you can check yourself.

Details: The signed statement →

SLSA and provenance

INDUSTRY TERM

SLSA is a framework for build provenance: a record of how a piece of software was built. Attestree does not build vendors’ installers, so its signed statements are not SLSA provenance; they record what an installer did in a sandbox.

Details: The signed statement →

Typed confirmation

A high-consequence action you confirm by typing an exact phrase that names what it will do and where, so consent is specific rather than a generic yes.

Details: Roles and policy →

Uninstall entry

Also: ARP entry, product code

The Add/Remove Programs record Windows keeps for an installed app. A product code (an MSI GUID, or an installer’s uninstall key) identifies the app reliably; a name and version alone are only a guess.

Details: Adopting an existing fleet →

Unverified-installer acceptance

Also: deployment-wide acceptance, the “unverified · accepted” label

A Community Edition operator’s recorded decision that an installer no sandbox can test may still be served, for one package and architecture. It records who accepted it and why, lasts up to 12 months, and is bound to the download sources the operator approved. It never covers bytes a sandbox rejected. It is a decision, never evidence: the installer stays unverified, and every endpoint that has it labels it unverified, accepted. It serves only once per-box serving is on, and one that lapses or is revoked stops new serving without removing copies. A deployment with no detonation host can turn on one deployment-wide acceptance instead. A dedicated instance has neither.

Details: What gets served →

Withdrawn upstream

Also: tombstoned

A winget version that has disappeared from its public source. One you only observed or quarantined is tombstoned, barred from new admission; one you attested keeps its status and gets a badge.

Details: Versions withdrawn upstream →

Every definition here holds for the current platform release. Where a term names something that is not built yet, the definition says so. The promises these terms describe are on the trust page.